We introduce a new methodology for designing block ciphers with provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. It is based on three new principles: change of the location of round functions, round functions with recursive structure, and substitution boxes of different sizes. The first realizes parallel computation of the round functions without losing provable security, and the second reduces the size of substitution boxes; moreover, the last is expected to make algebraic attacks difficult. This structure gives us a simple and effective method for designing secure and fast block ciphers in hardware as well as in software implementation. Block encryption algorithm MISTY was designed on the basis of this methodology.
Introduction
In the first version of differential cryptanalysis, the notion "characteristic" was successfully used for breaking block ciphers; if a cipher has a characteristic whose probability is high enough, it is possible to recover some of secret key bits by differential cryptanalysis. On the other hand, Lai, Massey and Murphy [2] found that its converse is not necessarily true, and showed that the notion "differential," instead of characteristic, strictly reflects the strength of a cipher against differential cryptanalysis. Since a differential is, roughly speaking, a collection of characteristics, even if the maximal characteristic probability is low, it cannot be concluded that the cipher is strong against differential cryptanalysis. Meanwhile, Nyberg and Knudsen [6] first showed an example of a block cipher whose maximal differential probability is low enough; they have called such property "provable security" against differential cryptanalysis.
In linear cryptanalysis, we can see a similar situation. The first version of linear cryptanalysis also applied "characteristic" (of linear cryptanalysis) to an attack of block ciphers, but Nyberg [5] has recently showed that a collection of characteristics, which she called "linear hull," must be taken into consideration for strict evaluation of the strength against linear cryptanalysis. Since the example given in [6] has a low hull probability, it is also provably secure against linear cryptanalysis; however, its computational complexity is not small because it requires a calculation over galois field GF (2 33 ). The purpose of this paper is to discuss a new method for obtaining provably secure and practical block ciphers against differential and linear cryptanalysis. First, we change the location of round functions, which enables their parallel computation without losing provable security. Next, we construct the round functions recursively, which reduces the size of substitution boxes. We also introduce substitution boxes of different sizes, which are expected to increase immunity against possible algebraic attacks; e.g. an explicit description of the entire cipher by a simple algebraic function.
This structure gives us a simple and effective method for designing secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis and fast block ciphers in hardware as well as in software implementation. Block encryption algorithm MISTY was designed on the basis of this methodology. We will also discuss related open problems on possible lower bound of differential and linear hull probability.
Security of Substitution Boxes
The purpose of this section and the next section is to give fundamental definitions and lemmas necessary for later sections. We will discuss immunity against differential and linear cryptanalysis in a parallel and selfcontained form. The first model in this section is a fixed substitution table S with n input/output bits (Fig. 1) . Throughout this paper, the input bit size of any substitution box is equal to its output bit size. We now start with the following definition. ∆x, Γx ∈ X and ∆y, Γy ∈ Y ,
where a•b denotes the parity (0 or 1) of bitwise product of a and b.
Note that DP S and LP S run from 0 to 1. Although the notation of LP S is slightly different from a standard definition of linearity, this is convenient for treating differential and linear cryptanalysis in a similar way. DP S and LP S for a strong substitution box S must be small for any ∆x( | = 0), Γx ∈ X and ∆y, Γy( | = 0) ∈ Y ; otherwise, an attacker can extract some input (output) information from output (input) information without knowing a detailed inner structure of S. This easily leads to the following security parameters that represent immunity of S against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
Definition 2:
For any S, it is easy to see that DP
−n+1 for odd n. Hence the above example establishes the lowest (best) probability if n is odd. Note that the cubic function is a bijective map over GF (2 n ) if and only if n is an odd number. The following is an example of a good bijectvie function for even n.
This example is the lowest (best) known probability when n is even. That is, it is an open problem whether there exists a bijective function where LP
or LP S max < 2 −n+2 . For more details, see [4] .
Note: For the inverse function of example 2, LP
S max has a complicated form when n is odd, which can be seen in [1] .
Now we show two simple lemmas which are useful in the following sections.
Lemma 1:
where x∈X denotes
#X
x∈X and the symbol • has higher priority than the symbol ⊕.
Lemma 2: For any S,
Moreover, if S is a permutation,
Proof: We show Γx∈X LP S (Γx → Γy) = 1. The remaining part is then trivial.
where the last sum is non-zero if and only if x = x . Hence we easily see that the above must be equal to 1.
Security of Key-Dependent Functions
The next model is a key-dependent function F as shown in Fig. 2 . Let K be a set of all possible key values. We define the strength of F as an "average" strength of F k when k runs over K, where F k denotes a onevariable function with a fixed key k. That is 
Fig. 4 Two-round model (II).
Definition 3:
In particular, when F is an encryption function, and DP F and LP F are small enough for any ∆x( | = 0), Γx ∈ X and ∆y, Γy( | = 0) ∈ Y , we say that F is provably secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Equivalently, F has provable security if the following values are small:
In the rest of this section, we consider two cases where the key-dependent function F has a special form (Figs. 3  and 4) . The following fundamental theorem shows that average strength of the entire cipher is represented by a collection of all possible "probabilistic paths," where the first equality was proved by Lai, Massey and Murphy [2] , and the second by Nyberg [5] . Though their original papers have wider frameworks, we here give a direct proof for our convenience.
Theorem 1 ([2]
, [5] ): For the function F shown in Fig. 3 ,
Proof:
Since clearly k 1 ∈ K 1 does not affect the conclusion, we neglect k 1 . For the first equality,
where the last term DP
F2 k2
represents a conditional probability that ∆y results in ∆z when ∆x causes ∆y. In other words, there exists a subsetỸ of Y ,
Therefore the second sum of (16) is
For the second equality,
where the last sum is nonzero if and only if S 1 (x) ⊕ S 1 (x ) ⊕ y ⊕ y = 0. Hence by eliminating y and substituting k 2 for y we obtain
Note that the above theorem assumes that S 1 and S 2 are fixed substitution tables without key. However we can extend them to key-dependent functions as follows. This theorem will be effectively used when we introduce a flamework of block ciphers with a recursive structure in the next section.
Theorem 2:
For the function F shown in Fig. 4 ,
Proof: We show the first equality. The second can be similarly derived.
By using theorem 1 for fixed ki 1 and ki 2 , we have
The following corollary shows that an (r + 1)-round cipher is not "weaker" than an r-round cipher with the same round functions.
Corollary 1:
Moreover, if F is bijective for any key value,
Proof: We show the first inequality. The remaining part can be similarly proved. For any ∆x | = 0 and ∆z, we have, by lemma 2 and theorem 2,
New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable Security
In [6] , Nyberg and Knudsen first showed an example of a DES-like block cipher with provable security against differential cryptanalysis. Nyberg also showed in [5] that this example also has provable security against linear cryptanalysis. Its principle is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([5]
, [6] ): For the r-round (r > = 3) function F given in Fig. 5 , assume that each substitution box S i is bijective and DP
Note: The original form of this theorem was not p 2 but 2p 2 . Recently K. Aoki and K. Ohta found this better bound p 2 .
Example 3:
In Fig. 5 , let n be an odd number and each S i (1 < = i < = 3) be a cubic function over galois field GF (2 n ) (hence F has 2n input/output bits). Then since DP 
Example 4:
In Fig. 5 , let n be an even number and each S i (1 < = i < = 3) be an inverse function over galois field GF (2 n ) (hence F has 2n input/output bits). Then since DP
The purpose of the remaining part of this section is to discuss various extensions of theorem 3. First, we change the location of the substitution boxes as in Fig. 6 . Then we can prove the following.
Theorem 4:
For the r-round (r > = 3) function F given in Fig. 6 , assume that each substitution box S i is bijective and DP
Proof: We prove the theorem when r = 3. The case r > 3 is then trivial using corollary 1. We consider four cases:
Case 2: If ∆x L = 0, then ∆x R | = 0. The output difference of S 2 is zero and the input difference of S 3 must be equal to ∆y R ; hence ∆y R | = 0.
Case 3: If ∆y L ⊕ ∆y R = 0, then the input difference of S 3 is zero and the output difference of S 1 must be equal to ∆x L . Hence ∆x L | = 0 and ∆x
Case 4: Otherwise, let the output difference of S 1 be ∆α, which is not determined uniquely. By a similar method to the proof of theorem 1, we have
Theorem 4 shows that Fig. 6 is as strong as Fig. 5 concerning to both differential and linear cryptanalysis under the condition that all S i 's are bijective. It should be also noted that in Fig. 6 two neighboring substitution boxes are parallelizable. Moreover, this theorem is valid even if the substitution boxes are affected by the secret key as in Fig. 7 . That is, the following theorem holds, which enables us to construct round functions recursively. Its proof can be done in the same way.
Theorem 5:
For the r-round (r > = 3) function F given in Fig. 7 , assume that each function F i is bijective for any key and DP
Example 5: In Fig. 7 , assume that each F i (1 < = i < = 3) has the structure shown in Fig. 6 and let S ij (the j-th substitution box in F i (1 < = j < = 3)) be a cubic function over GF (2 n ) for an odd n (hence F has 4n input/output bits). Then DP
and similarly, LP
Example 6: In Fig. 7 , assume that each F i (1 < = i < = 3) has the structure shown in Fig. 6 and let S ij (the j-th substitution box in F i (1 < = j < = 3)) be an inverse function over GF (2 n ) for an even n (hence F has 4n input/output bits). Then DP
Lastly, we can extend theorem 5 to the case where the bit size of X L is not necessarily the same as that of X R . This technique gives us variety and freedom in designing block ciphers.
Theorem 6:
For the r-round (r > = 3) function F given in Fig. 7 , let the bit size of X L and X R be n and m (n < = m), respectively. We assume that at the first and third XORs, the left n-bit data is zero-extended to m-bit, and at the second XOR the left m-bit data is truncated to n-bit. If each function F i is bijective for any key, then we have
Proof:
The difference from the proof of theorem 5 is "Case 2" only. In this case, since only lower n bits of ∆α are determined uniquely, the number of possible ∆α is 2 m−n . (QED)
Example 7: In Fig. 7 , assume that each F i (1 < = i < = 3) has the structure shown in Fig. 6 . Let S i1 and S i3 be cubic functions over GF (2 17 ) and S i2 be a cubic function over GF (2 15 ) (hence F has 64 input/output bits). Then since DP Example 8: In Fig. 7 , assume that each F i (1 < = i < = 3) has the structure shown in Fig. 6 . Let S i1 , S i2 and S i3 be inverse functions over GF (2 16 ) (hence F has 64 input/output bits). Then since DP These examples show that our inequal division may attain better probability than an ordinary equal division. This phenonimon is based on the conjecture that for even n there does not exist a bijective function S that attains DP S max < 2 −n+2 or LP S max < 2 −n+2 .
Conclusions
This paper introduced a new methodology for designing block ciphers with provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. The recursive structure enables us to design a strong block cipher by combining small strong components; moreover the change of locations of round functons makes parallel computation possible, which results in fast encryption in hardware as well as in software implementation. We will show a detailed structure of a practical block cipher MISTY that was desinged in these principles in the forthcoming paper.
